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ONE HUNDRED FIFTY CASES PER YEAR: SOME
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
LIMITED RESOURCES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF AGENCY ACTION
Peter L. Strauss*
Recent writing about the Supreme Court has stressed the implications of the extraordinary growth in the Court's docket-and, even
more, the growth in the overall level of judicial activity in the nation's
courts-for its performance of its judicial task.' Generally, this writing
seeks first to determine whether the Court has been forced to bypass
questions it ought normally to hear (for example, square conflicts between two of the federal circuits),2 editorializes about the increasing
Copyright © Peter L. Strauss 1987.
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. A.B., Harvard,
1961; LL.B., Yale, 1964. This analysis owes much to the many participants in faculty
workshops at Columbia and William & Mary, to Owen Fiss, Ronald Levin, Richard
Posner, and Edward Foley, a former student.
1. Two very recent commentaries, Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1400 (1987) and Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit
Committee, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1417 (1987), collect the relevant literature. What follows
has been particularly informed by S. Estreicher & J. Sexton, Redefining the Supreme
Court's Role: A Theory of Managing the Federal Judicial Process (1986); R. Posner,
The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (1985); Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger
Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 947 (1985) [hereinafter Case Selection]; Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of
Discretionary Review, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 795 (1983) [hereinafter Error Correction];
Hellman, The Supreme Court, The National Law, and the Selection of Cases for the
Plenary Docket, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 521 (1983) [hereinafter The Supreme Court]; and
Kurland & Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, October Term 1982, 50 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 628 (1983).
For recent judicial statements on the problem, see (in addition to the works of
Court of Appeals Judges Ginsburg and Posner, already cited) Brennan, Some Thoughts
on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 Judicature 230 (1982-83); Burger, The Time is
Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, at 86; Powell, Are the Federal
Courts Becoming Bureaucracies, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370 (1982); Rehnquist, The Changing
Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (1986); Stevens, Some Thoughts on
Judicial Restraint, 66Judicature 177 (1982); White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A
Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. St. BJ. 346 (1982).
2. Most of the works in the preceding footnote address these questions. The studies undertaken by Professor Hellman and by Professors Estreicher and Sexton are noteworthy for their efforts at disciplined and catholic analysis. The testimony of judges
themselves has often been that conflicts are too frequently passed by, and that testimony
has, in itself, been convincing to some. See, e.g., the congressional testimony ofJudge
Robert H. Bork of the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, quoted in Baker & McFarland, supra note 1, at 1415 n.77.
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bureaucratization of the Court, 3 and passes on to normative questions
about what if anything ought to be done to ease the Court's burden.
Scholars debate how many conflicts are being let slide, sometimes
reaching the reassuring conclusion that the number is little if at all
4
larger than the number of cases unwisely or unnecessarily heard.
They worry about the impact on the general quality of the Justices' intellectual efforts of having more law clerks to supervise and less time
per vote to consider the matters on their plate. 5 Contention then turns
to whether we should have an intercircuit tribunal to resolve questions
that are important (but not too important); 6 how such a tribunal ought
to be arranged in relation to the Court; or whether, perhaps, the real
solution lies in specialized appellate tribunals 7 or in more thoughtful
efforts by Congress to prevent statutory controversy by careful drafting
8
or periodic legislative revision.
This Article is principally concerned with a question that seems not
to have been much asked in these debates: whether, and in what ways,
the stresses on the Court might be manifesting themselves in its opinions and, particularly, in doctrine. It starts with a brief presentation of
the Court's well-known caseload problems, presenting them in relation
to the overall dimensions of the judicial system in the United States.
Looking beyond the Court's success in identifying and resolving particular, actual conflicts among the lower courts, this perspective treats as
the central problem of interest the Court's shrinking opportunity to
contribute discipline, cohesion and control to the nation's law. The essay then examines three different respects in which it might be thought
the natural limits on the Court's opportunities to speak are shaping the
character of the legal order.
First, and most generally, these limits contribute to a manner of
3. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 1, at 102-19; Kurland & Hutchinson, supra note
1, at 636; Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale LJ. 1442 (1983);
Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1, 16-25 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Hellman, Case Selection, supra note 1, at 1014-20, 1048-49; Hellman,
Error Correction, supra note 1, at 853-77; S. Estreicher &J. Sexton, supra note 1, at
91-103, finding the problem within manageable dimensions. However, Baker &
McFarland, supra note 1, at 1406, report 40 dissents from denial of certiorari on "conflict" grounds during the 1985 Term; they also refer to an unpublished study by L. Beck,
in the office of the Administrative Assistant to the ChiefJustice, appearing to identify 82
unreached conflicts between the circuits during the 1984 Term, and an additional 200
characterized as possible, but uncertain or jurisdictionally remote, matters.
5. See supra note 3; Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, Litigation, Spring 1983, at
20. Baker & McFarland, supra note 1, at 1403, are graphic on the dimensions of the
enterprise, even allowing for some padding in some of the numbers-for example, by
including pages in petitions for review that are formally required but rarely, if ever,
require study.
6. The literature on the intercircuit tribunal is most recently collected in Baker &
McFarland and Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Griswold, Helping the Supreme Court by Reducing the Flow of Cases
into the Courts of Appeals, 67Judicature 58, 65-66 (1983).
8. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 1, at 1429-34.
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speaking that emphasizes the enunciation of doctrine over the resolution of disputes. That is, faced with a controversy over a subject it is
likely to see but once or twice a decade, the Court will tend to write an
essay on that subject-hoping to put that part of the law's house in
order-rather than simply decide the case in the most direct manner
possible. The structural basis of this incentive to write expansively
challenges widely accepted models of and justifications for judicial
decision.
Second, the Court's awareness how infrequently it is able to review
lower court decisions has led it to be tolerant, even approving, of lower
court and party indiscipline in relation to existing law. The Court not
only expects the lower courts to vary in theirjudgments, but also knows
that it may not reach these unresolved conflicts for years, until they
have proved their importance. In particular, it has allowed federal
agencies that fail to secure immediate Supreme Court review of an important point to continue to pursue their position for at least as long as
that position holds reasonable prospects for success. The result puts
added stress on some ideas about obedience to law and on the uniformity of national law administration.
Third, the Court's opinions on the merits may be influenced by its
management dilemmas. It may choose outcomes that tend to make its
control over the appellate courts more effective; or that tend to reduce
the opportunities those courts might enjoy for adventurism free of
close supervision by the Court; or that tend to shape lower court results
to reduce the likelihood of conflicts requiring Court intervention. Five
notable recent developments in Supreme Court decision seem explicable in these terms: the Court's new stress on statutory language as central to resolution of issues of statutory interpretation; its repeated
expressions of concern for disturbing "complex" and/or "intricate"
statutory regimes; its increased reluctance to use regulatory statutes as
the basis for inferring new private causes of action; its otherwise surprising decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc.9 requiring lower courts to accept "reasonable" agency interpretations of statutes on questions that could not be said "directly" to have
been resolved by Congress10 ; and its decision a year earlier in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. 11; to endorse relatively aggressive "hard look review" of agency action by the lower federal courts.
For the moment, this analysis is strictly impressionistic. No claims
can be made about empirical verification. Yet the dimensions of the
Court's problem are such as virtually to compel the hypothesis that
some such effect must be occurring. And this analysis has the advan9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

10. Id. at 842-45.
11. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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tage of permitting the reconciliation of the last two cases-cases that
many observers, strikingly including several judges of the federal courts
of appeals, have asserted to be inconsistent. For the Court to be deciding cases so as to ease its management problems, moreover, may only
underscore the importance of its caseload crisis. Any such influence is
an artifact, unconnected with the parties' claims to justice or the nation's claim to sound judgment on the merits of an important legal issue. To the extent the analysis validly explains the observable
phenomena of the Supreme Court's decisions, then, it only underscores the need for more fundamental attention to the problem that
generates it.
I. COMMON GROUND: THE EVER-EXPANDING DOCKET

"From Taft onward, the Justices have emphasized that the function
of the Supreme Court is not to correct errors in the lower courts, but to
'secur[e] harmony of decision and the appropriate settlement of questions of general importance.' "12 With the tremendous expansion of
federal judicial business, academic writers and Justices alike have
stressed that working for the general coherence of the national legal
system is the only possible function of the Court, and have raised
doubts whether any institution of nine mortals can make significant
progress even to that end.13 This is a counsel of practicality; the enormousness of the Court's potential docket prohibits it from serving the
function, simply, of a court of errors. Rather than say whether particular decisions are right or wrong, the Court can afford only to identify
those settings in which a national system of law demands its intervention, for example to avoid systematic variation in the application of national law. In general, we think it more aggravating if citizens of Maine
and Florida are threatened with having to live under different understandings of the same federal statute (as put in place by the judgments
of their respective courts of appeals) than if citizens of Illinois are faced
12. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does the Supreme
Court Need Help?, 67 Judicature 28, 30-31 (1983) (quoting ChiefJustice Hughes, 20
A.B.A.J. 341, 341 (1934)); see also Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66
Judicature 177, 182 (1982) (Supreme Court should shape national law, not correct
errors).

13. See supra note 1. For a more skeptical view, see Ginsburg & Huber, supra note
1, at 1434-35:
It is good for the Supreme Court to turn its attention away from philosopher.
king problems and toward the pedestrian statutory staples of the lawyer's craft,
just as it is useful for the lower courts to be reminded periodically that their
decisions, both large and small, must be woven harmoniously into a single, national, legal fabric. But the Court is not required to resolve intercircuit conflicts, nor should that task loom too large on its agenda. The national court, is
above all, a court, not a standing committee responsible for the rationalization
and revision of federal statutes. No second national court is needed to assist
the Supreme Court in doing better what it already does quite well and often
enough.
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with a unique, and possibly erroneous, reading of another statute. As
an ideal, we assert that each court seeks fidelity to law in its judgments.
Recognizing that that effort may not lead all judges to reach identical
conclusions, we seek 14to direct the Supreme Court's resources into
avoiding incoherence.
This managerial perspective, as it has recently been characterized,1 5 embodies a vision we intuitively accept over the whole range of
judicial action. The most elementary principles of justice, the idea of
the common law, the supremacy clause of the American Constitutionall speak of an integrated and coherent body of law, and justify judicial
pronouncements of law as maintaining that coherence. Less noticed is
that the managerial perspective parallels descriptions often given ofjudicial review in relation to agency action. In his classic work Judicial
Control of Administrative Action, Louis Jaffe characterized the constitutional courts as "the acknowleged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the legal system... integrity here in its specific sense of unity
and coherence and in its more general sense of the effectuation of the
values upon which this unity and coherence are built."' 6 Like the
Supreme Court in relation to it, a reviewing court of appeals is not to
sit over an agency as a court of errors, but as an enforcer of the
agency's rationality and coherence. The rationales for this relationship,
too, are cousins of the reasons given for the managerial judicial role:
that the volume of agency activity and the sporadic nature of review, in
practice, permit no stronger relationship. Yet that relationship appears
sufficient to engender the agency's respect for and adherence to "law"
17
that marks the central premise of our governmental order.
To be effective, however, even a role described in management
terms requires a certain immediacy of contact with the institutions being managed, a believable presence that reinforces the willingness to
accept direction. The question about the ever-expanding docket is, in
effect, a question about whether (or under what circumstances) that immediacy of contact can be maintained in the face of the enormous
growth in the nation's judicial business. Since adoption of the Judges'
14. Whether and to what extent the Court is responsible for securing change in
national law, independent of what may be required of it in the continuing search for
coherence, is not addressed here.
15. S.Estreicher &J. Sexton, supra note 1, at 4.
16. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 327 (1965).
17. Id. at 320-37. Testing the sufficiency of this relationship would be difficult.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the courts (and for that matter thousands of government

lawyers striving to connect their agencies' work to "law") imagine that it exists. The
cultural premise that law constrains is what holds the delegation doctrine at bay; were a
court to conclude in any case that an agency had passed beyond legal control-that
there existed "no law to apply," Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410-13 (1971), in a situation that required such controls-"delegation" would
immediately reappear in full fhry.
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Bill of 192518 (itself a response to judicial overload) put the modem
regime in place, for example, the business of the federal appellate and
district courts has expanded dramatically, while the Supreme Court's
capacity for work has increased hardly at all. Among the many ways in
which that expansion has been described, the following paragraphs
seem particularly likely to convey the dramatic change in the management challenge facing the Supreme Court:
In 1925, there were 42 circuit judges and 128 district judges;
thus, each Supreme Court Justice represented 4.7 circuit
judges and 14.2 district judges. In 1987, 156 circuit judgeships and 563 district judgeships are authorized; each
Supreme Court Justice now represents 17.3 circuit judges1 9
and 62.6 district judges. 20 While the hierarchical relationship
between circuit judge and district judge has not much changed
in sixty years (1:3 in 1925; 1:3.6 in 1987), Supreme CourtJustices are four times as remote from the rest of the federal judiciary today as they were when the Judges' Bill of 1925 was
21
passed.
"In 1924, the Court reviewed about one in ten decisions of the
courts of appeals .... [I]n the 1984 Term the Court was able
to review only 0.56% of court of appeals decisions ...
[T]hese courts of error, at least for practical purposes, have
become the final expositors of federal law in their geographical region in all but a miniscule number of cases." 22 If a court
of appeals judge participates each year in about 125 cases with
signed opinions, writing the opinion in one third of those, 23
Supreme Court review of one in ten would put her in direct
18. Pub. L. No. 415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. III 1985).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. III 1985).
21. This is, to be sure, a crude measure of change. It might be argued that the
relevant exposure is to decision units (panels) rather than individual judges and that it
should include the states. Taking the Supreme Court as one panel, and the courts of
appeals as representing a third as many panels as judges, the ratios of Supreme Court
Justices to circuit judges to district judges in 1925 were 1:14:128, with one court of
appeals panel for each 9 district judges; in 1987, 1:52:563, with one court of appeals
panel for each 11 district judges. For the states, the number of high court panels has
remained essentially constant, although their level of work has escalated (and has been
purified by the adoption of discretionary review measures), and the proportion of their
work that could reach the Supreme Court has almost certainly increased. Perhaps the
effective change in the Court's exposure is not as great as that from 1:14 to 1:50; then
one could say that the Court's remoteness from decisionmakers on federal law has not
increased by quite as much, overall, as the text figures appear to suggest. Note, however, that the figures given in the next paragraph in text are specifically federal in their
orientation, suggesting that the remoteness in fact from lower federal court decision is
greater than the change in panel ratios alone would suggest.
22. Baker & McFarland, supra note 1, at 1405-06.
23. R. Posner, supra note 1, at 69, reports 5572 signed opinions for the courts of
appeals in 1983. Assuming them to have been evenly distributed among 45 panels of
three means approximately 125 opinions per panel, 42 perjudge. Given the participation of senior judges and other factors, the actual numbers are lower.
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intellectual contact with the Court several times over the
course of a year; review of one in 200 suggests that even her
panel votes will not be reviewed as often as once a year, and
her opinions, on average, will come under scrutiny only two or
three times in a decade.
Seeing the Supreme Court's changed circumstances just in relation
to the lower federal judiciary leaves out a good deal, such as the increasingly federal business of the state courts. For an administrative
lawyer, perhaps the most striking change in the dimensions of the judicial pyramid at whose apex the Court sits is the enormous body of adjudication assigned during and after the New Deal to article I
adjudicators, such as bankruptcy judges or administrative law judges.
Here, the overblown dimensions of the judicial pyramid are yet further
enlarged. While 277,031 cases were filed in United States District
Court in 1983,24 that year saw 391,108 new filings with the potential for
requiring hearings referred to the federal government's 1121 administrative law judges.2 5 Virtually no such filings were part of federal judicial business in 1925. Within the Department of Health and Human
Services alone, 760 administrative law judges (themselves confronting a
caseload much winnowed by prior proceedings at the state level) faced
363,533 possible hearings on welfare and disability benefit issues. 26
And much administrative action occurs in a less formal setting, yet also
within the pyramid of judicial supervision and control that ends at the
Supreme Court. In the early 1970s, the Department of Labor's Wage
and Hour Division responded to 750,000 inquiries per year about the
meaning of a single program, with 10,000 of those responses the result
of a process sufficiently formal to warrant the administrator's signature. 2 7 In both settings, a proportion of the administrative outcomes is
important enough to the parties to reach the federal courts each year, 28

yet only a handful get the attention of the Supreme Court. 29
24. R. Posner, supra note 1, at Appendix B.
25. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the
Trees, 31 Fed. B. News &J. 383, 384 (1984).
26. Id. at 384.
27. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 699
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
28. In 1983, there were 821 Fair Labor Standards Act and 20,309 Social Security
Act filings in district courts; 47 and 992, respectively in the courts of appeals. R. Posner,
supra note 1, at 64. That year, the Supreme Court issued no FLSA decisions, and just

one reviewing the Department of Health and Human Services. The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Leading Cases, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 300 (1983). In the following year the
numbers were 1 and 2, respectively. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 312-14 (1984).
29. Westlaw reported 21 FLSA cases involving wages and hours disputes over the
last three decades, less than one each year. (An additional number treat
antidiscrimination statutes.) Sorting out welfare or disability cases in the same manner
proved more difficult.
Professor Hellman's studies, perhaps the most careful longitudinal studies the
Supreme Court's use of certiorari jurisdiction has ever received, show what ought not to
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Independent of the size of its intellectual task, the Supreme Court
is the prisoner of the time available to its members. 30 For good reason,
to enhance its status as the final arbiter of legal disputes, we wish the
Court to sit as a single panel, with each member hearing every case.
Time constraints thus sharply limit the number of cases the Court can
hear. In recent years, it has been hearing about 150 cases annually.
Another way of saying this, of course, is that the Justices have only 150
full 3 ' opportunities yearly to carry out their function. No one suggests
this number could be increased very much. Given the steady, if not
explosive, growth of the Court's potential docket, each of these 150
cases represents an increasingly precious opportunity for the Court to
perform its supervisory task.
II.

THE MODERN LAW-GIVER

In light of the foregoing, it should not be surprising that management concerns have come to dominate both the selection of cases and
the writing of opinions. 32 The premise of certiorari jurisdiction is that
be a surprising variation in the intensity with which the Court involves itself in different
statutory schemes. He found Labor Board cases and employment discrimination cases
arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1982),
frequently represented on its docket; but the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), two other labor statutes generating large
amounts of litigation in the lower courts, rarely appear there. Tax decisions, too, appear
only infrequently in relation to their general importance to federal litigation. See
Hellman, The Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 609-14, 631-33; Hellman, Case Selection, supra note 1, at 1051-55.
30. A particularly compelling account appears in Baker & McFarland, supra note 1,
at 1401-04; see also other sources listed supra note 1.
31. For strong criticism of even this much activity as defeating the possibility of
disciplined Supreme Court action, see Kurland &Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 643-44;
Monaghan, supra note 3, at 22-23. Justice Stevens in particular has objected vigorously
to this practice. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 972 n.4 (1982).
Rather than heed these criticisms, however, the Court has apparently been increasing
the number of occasions on which it speaks, by deciding matters without full briefing on
the petition for certiorari. This practice is not only questionable in terms of the Court's
readiness to decide, but also counterproductive. It gives the writers of certiorari petitions (and oppositions) just the wrong incentives. See Montana v. Hall, 107 S. Ct. 1825
(1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. The Justices are routinely criticized for taking cases for error correction rather
than serving a management function. Commonly this occurs in the course of finding
that, if the Court were only more rigorously self-disciplined in its case selection, it would
find that it had all the resources it needed to deal with serious intercircuit conflicts and
other occasions for management intervention. See S. Estreicher &J. Sexton, supra note
1, at 91-103; R. Posner, supra note 1, at 164; Kurland & Hutchinson, supra note 1, at
644-46. Professor Hellman seems more philosophical:
[I]n a larger sense [the Court's failure of self-discipline is] a source of reassurance. The Court is not a computer .... Half or more of its cases will receive
plenary consideration in response to the exigent needs of the legal systemneeds that would draw a similar response from almost any group ofjustices.
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the Court will select for hearing those cases whose resolution is likely to
make the largest contribution to the uniformity and cohesion of national law. While the Court may not often be as candid as the New
York Court of Appeals once was about the programmatic character of
its certiorari decisions, 33 it should hardly be surprising that its opinions
tend to stress law pronouncement over dispute resolution. Perceived
function and the imperatives of limited capacity to perform that function, naturally enough, are shaping style.
Consider, in this light, the complaint of a recent, unjoined concurrence by the nation's newest Supreme Court Justice:
There are proper occasions for alternative holdings, where
one of the alternatives does not eliminate the jurisdictional
predicate for the other-though even in that situation the
practice is more appropriate for lower courts than for this
Court, whose first arrow runs no risk of being later adjudged
to have missed its mark. But where, as here, it is entirely clear
that an issue of law is not presented by the facts of the case, it
is beyond our jurisdiction to reach it ....
It has never been
suggested . . . that the constitutional prohibition upon our
34
rendering of advisory opinions is a doctrine of convenience.
Justice Scalia's criticism of his majority colleagues' excessive writing reflects a familiar view of judicial function and, in particular, of the
source of judges' authority to "make law." Under this traditional
model, parties bring a case to the court to resolve a live dispute that
exists between them, one they have been unable to resolve by less formal means. Thejudge is obliged to decide between them, and to do so
by applying the established matrix of the law to the fresh facts the parties bring before her. On this view, new or changing law is a by-product of the pattern of decision over time, of the accidental insufficiencies
of existing patterns to resolve the dispute. The judge's obligation to
But the remainder of the plenary docket is shaped in large part by the interests
and predilections of the justices now sitting. In short, the Burger Court, like its
predecessors, is a very human institution. And although it performs a unique
lawmaking function-a function that quite properly dominates the selection
process-it is also a Court whose members care about doing justice in individual cases and elaborating upon precedents in the common law tradition. This
is not a tidy arrangement, but it is one that has worked remarkably well for
nearly two hundred years.
Hellman, Case Selection, supra note 1, at 1048-49.
33. "We granted leave to appeal in order to take another step toward a complete
solution of the problem partially cleared up in Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, and
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American CyanamidCo., 11 N.Y.2d 5 (both decided after the making

of the Special Term and Appellate Division orders here appealed from)." Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 434, 191 N.E.2d 81, 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592,

593 (1963). The court's parenthetical remark makes emphatically clearjust who is making the law here; there can be no pretense that this litigation is a natural outgrowth of its
earlier decisions.
34. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 697-98 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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decide, and her (and the parties') focus on the concrete dispute, justify
the pronouncement of law; and the justification reaches no further.
Not only is the judge not supposed to write beyond the case ("dictum"
is the nasty word used to describe the result when she does), but later
judges-even those in ostensibly inferior tribunals-are under no obligation to respect such statements. Learning the distinction between
"holding" and "dictum" remains the rite depassage for the neophyte law
student, the skill that qualifies him as a case lawyer.
A certiorari jurisdiction limited to producing 150 opinions from
several thousand petitions (themselves considerably winnowed by appreciation of the odds, especially among repeat litigators)3 5 requires
quite a different view about what courts are supposed to do and why. It
is the court that chooses the cases, not the dispute that forces itself
upon the judges' attention. As the pool of cases from which to choose
increases, and the number selected remains constant, the Court's freedom of choice and the stakes in making a given selection are also enhanced. Failure to choose a case has no significance for the parties,
since their dispute has already been provisionally resolved by lower
tribunals.3 6 The issue for the Court is not the parties' individual claims
to justice, but the marginal cost to its central function of the opportunity it foregoes by choosing this case instead of that one.3 7 The failure
to choose a case may have large implications for the coherence and
uniformity of the body of law for which the Court is responsible, depending upon the relative importance of the legal issue involved.
On the whole, then, the Court's docket is characterized by active
reexamination and reshaping of the existing matrix of law. In this
sense, one can say that the enunciation of law is its raison d'etre. This
aspect ofjudicial function has been recognized and used programmatically by some institutional litigants to spectacular effect, and an interesting literature has grown up attempting to put those developments
side-by-side, as it were, with the traditional model.3 8 Yet if one looks at
the Supreme Court, it is apparent that the traditional model ofjudging
35. Of the 5158 cases on the Supreme Court's docket in its 1985 Term, Baker &
McFarland, supra note 1, at 1401, 2571 were paid petitions, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Leading Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 100, 308 (1986), suggesting at least some level
of concern about the possible return a client could expect for additional legal services
cost. See also infra note 62 and accompanying text. 5158, then, is a number that is at
once too large and too small.
36. This assumes that the losing party will not be estopped to make its legal arguments again, should the issue arise anew in litigation against a different party. See infra
notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
37. Judge Posner's elegant discussion of holding and dictum, supra note 1, at
247-58, interestingly (for an economist) does not account for these incentives.
38. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1302-04 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1979); Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest
Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 655, 655-59.
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cases has all but disappeared.3 9
While it is conceivable that, having chosen their cases on managerial premises, the Justices would then address them in the traditional
mode, the realities and expectations reflected in the selection process
make this outcome unlikely. If the undertaking from the start were to
address legal uncertainties of a general character, simply resolving the
dispute in such a case would be an admission of defeat. Even if such an
undertaking were not explicit, the case before them could appear to the
Justices as their one chance in five years to address this particular corner of the law, impelling them to take some pains for the guidance of
lawyers and the lower courts.
Consider, for example, two cases from last term. In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association,40 a majority of the Court engaged in an elaborate
discussion of the "zone of interests" test for standing, when the case
could easily have been decided on narrower grounds. 4 1 Ignoring Justice Stevens' plea in concurrence simply to affirm the lower court's correct handling of the case, the majority noted commentators' demands
for clarification 4 2 and possible confusion in the courts of appeals in
other cases43 among its reasons for going into detail. Justice Stevens
surely was right in characterizing the Court's opinion as unnecessarily
broad.

Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,4 4 the Court found a state

supreme court remand to be a final judgment for purposes of its review
of the defendant's constitutional claims. The majority argued in part
that "if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now,
there may well be no opportunity to do so in the future."' 45 Justice
Stevens again objected, here in dissent, saying the Court should honor
"our long tradition of avoiding, not reaching out to decide, constitutional decisions when a case may be disposed of on other grounds."'4 6
Once a case has been taken, it can be dealt with expansively, for
the resources available for writing opinions in a justice's office are not
limited as sharply as the justice's own time. Today, four law clerks are
ready-eager-to assist in work that twenty-five years ago occupied
only two, and twenty-five years earlier, only one. While the political
realities of managing an enlarged office necessarily consume some proportion of a justice's personal time,4 7 the overall effect has been to in39. While stated in terms of the Supreme Court, this analysis seems equally applicable to courts of last resort in state law systems, to the extent that they too are faced with
growing dockets, increasingly complex law, and a discretionary jurisdiction with which
to attempt to keep the whole under discipline.

40. 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
41. Id. at 755-59.

42. Id. at 756 n.ll.
43. Id. at 757 n.15.
44. 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
45. Id. at 997 (footnote omitted).

46. Id. at 1011.
47. Supervising four clerks takes more time than supervising one or two, sug-
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crease the resources available for any one decision. Each law clerk has
perhaps four chances to assist in drafting opinions for the Court during
her term in office, where her predecessor assisted in eight. As one
might expect, while the number of cases decided by the Justices each
year has stayed essentially constant over the past several decades, the
number of pages per decision has more than doubled. 48 Moreover, the
increasing presence of the law clerk seems likely to reinforce, not to
check, the Court's incentive to use its opinions for expository purposes.
Her intellectual background is generally one of unusual success at an
elite university, not practical experience. That will make doctrinal explication far more comfortable ground than dispute resolution. Work
for the Law Review characterizes her history in dealing with cases.
Thus, unless her justice were to insist upon it, it is unlikely she would
feel that the parties' dispute rather than the opportunity to elucidate
49
doctrine was the primary focus.
Some controls on expansive opinion writing might be expected
from the need to secure colleagues' concurrence. Here, too, however,
one can imagine that circumstances often conspire in the opposite direction. All face the same incentives, and the prevailing culture, liberal
and conservative, appears not to resist them. Any justices seeking to
make their own doctrinal contributions when opportunity permits will
see an advantage in permitting others such freedom, in order themselves to win more tolerance from their colleagues. Perhaps most importantly, by imposing more rigorous intellectual demands, a practice
of writing relatively elaborate opinions dense with law shapes both the
review that other offices can give to drafts and the nature of their response.5 0 Other justices' time remains limited, and while their law
clerks can be asked to review in greater detail, their incentives seem
gesting greater freedom for the clerks and less for theJustice. See R. Posner, supra note
1, at 102-04. The need the Justice may feel to spend time maintaining office morale
points in the same direction.
48. The number of full decisions and U.S. Reports full opinion pages for Supreme
Court decisions over the past six decades are:
Term and Volumes
Opinions
Pages
Ratio
1925 (269-71 U.S.)
210
1788
8.5
1935 (296-98 U.S.)
145
1858
12.8
1945 (326-28 U.S.)
131
2046
15.6
1955 (350-51 U.S.)
94
1165
12.4
1965 (382-84 U.S.)
107
2185
20.3
1975 (423-28 U.S.)
159
4359
27.4
1983 (464-68 U.S.)
163
4410
27.1
See also R. Posner, supra note 1, at 114 (reporting growing number of opinions and
words per justice).
49. Judge Posner expresses a particularly sour view of the impact of law clerks on
the quality ofjudicial opinions. See supra note 1, at 106-19.
50. While the overall number of separate opinions issued by the Justices is increasing, R. Posner, supra note 1, at 114, this may be due to time pressures that make the
negotiations that can resolve disagreement more difficult. Review of drafts, rather than
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likely to be, at best, mixed-accepting of the general enterprise of catholic statement and quarrelsome only about particulars. It should not be
surprising, then, that deciding "more than we have to" does not appear
that often in the pages of the U.S. Reports as grounds for special concurrence. And even when it does, we often have reason to suspect that
more than objection to judicial excess lies behind its invocation. 5 1
III.

CONFLICT BELOW THE

Top

Appreciation of what a small proportion of lower court decisions
the Supreme Court's resources allow it to review contributes in a
number of ways to increasing the incoherence of federal law. The simplest effect is to permit a tendency toward geographical dispersion in
federal law: the infrequency of Supreme Court review combines with
the formal independence of each circuit's law from that of the other
circuits to permit a gradual balkanization of federal law. A second, related effect is that litigants who must appear in more than one circuit
are able (or even required) to govern their conduct by standards that
differ from place to place. Of course, this is a familiar enough proposition for matters governed by state law, but for law that we think of as
federal-that is, nationally uniform-it is at least unusual; the limits on
the Court's resources undercut the instinctive response, which is to
seek resolution at the Court. And a third, yet more troubling, effect
emerges when this multicircuit litigant is a governmental agency
charged, with greater or lesser explicitness, to administer a national
program in a uniform way. Such an agency may be tempted, even feel
obliged, to maintain its national understanding of that law even when
its judgment will probably be reviewed in one or more circuits that have
already disagreed with its view. Such "nonacquiescence" reflects a direct and disturbing collision between competing views of the obligations of adherence to law; again, the Court's resource problems forbid
the easy answer of compelling the agency to seek Court resolution.
face-to-face discussion, constitutes the principal conversation between justices about the
details of deciding cases. See Monaghan, supra note 3, at 16-25.
Professor Heliman argues, however, that the available evidence does not support
the idea that a smaller docket would produce greater unanimity. Hellman, supra note
12, at 32 & n.10.
51. While Justice Stevens and more recentlyJustice Scalia have sounded this note
with some consistency, others' adherence seems to have a possible relation to the merits.
In Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987), for example, Justice Stevens'
concurrence was joined by Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice. For them, it may
have been important that the majority used its "elaborate" opinion to explain a 1984
opinion byJustice O'Connor that signalled a conservative approach to public participation in judicial review of administrative proceedings. See Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). The majority's explanation sent the opposite signal; hence
the need for a special concurrence on the merits. Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
107 S. Ct. 989 (1987), the expansive majority opinion has a law-and-order cast to it.
Here, the ChiefJustice andJustice O'Connor joined the opinion, while justices Brennan
and Marshall, part of the willing Clarke explainers, were counted with Stevens in dissent.
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Simple geographical variation is the first of these effects. At the
court of appeals level, the vanishing chance that any given opinion will
be reviewed by higher authority ought to have a corresponding impact
on the discipline of decision, reducing virtually to altruism and professional habit the impulse to seek uniformity and coherence on a national
scale. Twelve United States courts of appeals, with their respective district courts, decide the legal issues raised before them for their geographical areas only. For a United States district court sitting in
Virginia, the views of the courts of appeals in the Ninth Circuit, the
Third or the District of Columbia are interesting, but only the Fourth
Circuit controls. Indeed, the enormousness of some circuits 52 and the
clumsiness of the en banc device have generated significant concerns
about securing even intracircuit uniformity.5 3 One of the impacts of
the tremendous growth in judicial business has been to make it less
necessary, perhaps even less feasible, to become aware of what coordinate courts are doing elsewhere in the country. As long ago as 1972,
when circuit court business was less than half the current level, one of
the nation's most respected court of appeals judges remarked,
The volume of precedents in each circuit and in the Supreme
Court has become so great that only rarely is it necessary to
rely on opinions of other circuits, and a district court opinion
is not likely to have an impact merely as authority unless it
comes from ajudge enjoying special esteem. The circuits have
become increasingly ingrown
or, if one prefers a less pejora54
tive term, self-contained.
Consider, for example, Fiber Glass Systems v. NLRB, 5 5 a case that
seemed ordinary enough to the Fifth Circuit panel deciding it to have
been placed on the summary calendar. A central issue was whether "in
all the circumstances" an employer's interrogation of his employees
had been coercive or threatening, warranting the Labor Board's unfair
labor practice determination. 56 The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce
the Board's order on account of the Board's failure to explain its decision in a format the court had previously said should be followed.
"This Circuit has developed a list of eight factors . . .to determine

whether an interrogation tends to be coercive or threatening in light of
the total circumstances.... Both the ALJ and the Board failed to apply
these factors .. . . 57 It may be, of course, that the Board had so failed
52. The Ninth Circuit now contains 28 judges, 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. III 1985),
fully two-thirds the entire circuit court judiciary at the time of the Judges' Bill of 1925.
53. The assumption that the availablity of en banc consideration assures intracircuit
uniformity is heroic for any circuit so large or geographically dispersed that any two of
its judges do not often sit together in panel. See R. Posner, supra note 1, at 102.
54. Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 St.John's L. Rev. 406, 413
(1972) (footnotes omitted).
55. 807 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1987).
56. Id. at 463.
57. Id.
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to articulate its reasoning that no reviewing court would have been able
to understand how it had reached its conclusion, even granting such
presumptive regularity as might be appropriate for such a judgment.
The point here, however, is that the reviewing court found it so obvious
that the Board ought to apply Fifth Circuit criteria in reaching its con58
clusion when it was deciding cases to be reviewed in the Fifth Circuit.
This geographical dispersion of federal law is not to be measured
simply by counting the number of actual conflicts among the circuits
the Court declines (or is unable) to reach in any given year. 59 Many
matters will not be presented to the Court because, on balance, an institutional litigator such as the Solicitor General believes it inappropriate. 60 More important, invocation of the Court's supervision, and
effective use of that invocation, are less likely when the sources of diversity are more subtle, as when geographical factors influence the ways in
which courts view facts or weigh the various considerations affecting
the resolution of a complex dispute. 6 1 Attorneys well aware that one
court of appeals is more receptive than another to a particular kind of
argument, may still be hard put to demonstrate the disagreement in
principle between two or more holdings that marks a persuasive certiorari petition. Such influences can be sharply felt by litigants, yet not
by a petition or disciplined by a Supreme Court
easily rendered
62
opinion.
The second effect is that litigants whose activities cross circuit
boundaries may find themselves subject to conflicting regimes of federal law. The Supreme Court's own recognition that an important conflict between two or more lower courts is a virtual necessity for (but no
guaranty of) securing review promotes understanding of litigant ac58. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. Only Fifth Circuit cases are cited

in the court's discussion of the coercion issue; as to none is there any indication that
certiorari was sought.

Scanning the pages of F.2d advance sheets, the author has noted similar patterns of
behavior in review of disability benefits claims.
59. See sources cited at supra note 4.
60. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
61. See generally R. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean
Air Act (1983) (describing varied court interpretations of environmental laws).
62. An example may be found in the government's submission on the petition for a

writ of certiorari in what became Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The Solicitor General opposed the

writ, on the conventional ground that the court of appeals had not acted with sufficient
clarity to make the case appropriate for review. Id. at 540, n.15. The Court, though,
disagreed, granted the writ, and reversed unanimously in one of the sterner rebukes it
has delivered to the D.C. Circuit in recent years. To the commentators, the impact the
D.C. Circuit's continual second-guessing of agency procedural choices was having on
agency decisionmaking was clear. See, e.g., Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C.
Circuit and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 365-68. Yet, the opposition

from the government's principal appellate litigator suggests there may be a real difference between understanding a legal defeat and demonstrating it in terms of legal
principle.
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tions that have the potential for generating conflicts. A court of errors,
knowing that any case can be brought to it, may have little patience for
a litigant who fails to appeal her loss in one case, and then reasserts her
position in another, even against a different party. A Court that knows
it can hear fewer than one in each one hundred cases decided in the
lower tribunals is more likely to wish the litigant to forebear from
troubling it and to prefer her to reassert her (losing) position below.
Then, she either will be persuaded to abandon it by successive failures,
or her persistence and partial success will mark it as one of the limited
number of disputes the Court ought to entertain.
For federal agencies facing unfavorable lower court rulings, the
problem of gaining the Court's attention is compounded by the need to
secure the permission of the Solicitor General even to seek a writ of
certiorari. In exercising his office's control over that question, the Solicitor General considers not only the abstract legal merits of cases proposed for a petition, but also the Court's limited resources to entertain
disputes. He knows that the Court relies heavily on his discretion. In
the long run, his refusal to permit agencies to seek review in marginal
cases builds his credibility with the Court and thus is in the government's interest.6 3 Accordingly, he will often be in the position of advising government agencies that they may not now seek review of a
troubling loss, but instead should continue to press their views below in
the hope of developing a conflict or, even where one exists, a more
64
compelling presentation.
Examining the question only from the perspective of the Supreme
Court's function, Professors Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton of
New York University Law School were undisturbed by the prospect of a
litigant having to live with conflicts among the circuits. 65 Their analysis
63. The author's personal experience with the Solicitor General's office in the mid1970s, when he was general counsel for a federal agency seeking access to the Court,
suggests the error in believing that the resulting winnowing is only of unmeritorious
cases. On three of the four occasions when the agency sought permission to invoke the
Court's review, the Solicitor General denied permission to do so. Private parties did
petition in these cases, and a government response was filed stating the agency's position. The three cases resulted in a summary reversal, a grant of certiorari eventually
vacated as moot, and a unanimous opinion on the merits, reversing the judgment below.
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of
Am., 423 U.S. 12 (1975); Allied-General Nuclear Serv. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 430 U.S. 944 (1977), vacated on suggestion of mootness, 434 U.S. 1030 (1978);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978). For a proposal to enhance the Solicitor General's ability to solicit meritorious cases, see Scalia, supra note 62, at 373-75.
64. Among the Solicitor General's formal responsibilities is that of instructing
other divisions of the Department of Justice in what arguments they may make when
appealing to the circuit courts. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1986). It is unclear, however,
how widely used, well-coordinated, or well-enforced this authority is.
65. Supra note 1, at 50-52. An earlier version of their work appeared as Estreicher
& Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical
Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681 (1984).
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focused on the Court's immediate business of selecting cases within its
certiorari jurisdiction. Naturally enough from that angle, they viewed
with a certain equanimity the prospect that, for a time, American law
could be unsettled, or even vary from place to place within the country,
reflecting the geographical organization and (to a certain extent) disposition of the lower judicial system. From a management perspective, it
is useful to permit issues to "percolate" through the system for a time,
taking them at the Supreme Court level only when it is evident both
that uniformity is required and that lower tribunals will not themselves
reach that outcome, without guidance from above.
In United States v. Mendoza,6 6 the Supreme Court endorsed this

view, relying in part on the limitations of its own position. There, it
unanimously found the government not estopped to make legal arguments it had previously lost in lower court proceedings against other
parties. 6 7 Government litigation, the Court said, frequently involves issues best resolved by allowing "thorough development" through "liti'68
gation in multiple forums," not by "freezing the first final decision."
Moreover, the Court explicitly noted that its own certiorari practice re69
lies on the benefits of percolation and conflicts among the circuits.
Control of litigation, most notably including the filing of certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court, is an executive branch responsibility. The
Court would certainly have been aware how responsive the executive
branch had been, in exercising that responsibility, to the Court's own
limitations. For it to have reached a result that in effect required the
government to pursue each lost issue to the Supreme Court or else
surrender its position, when the Court can review less than one percent
70
of courts of appeals decisions, would have been extraordinary.
In their defense of percolation, Professors Estreicher and Sexton
do not account for the additional strains that arise when a case comes
to the judicial system from a bureaucratic structure Congress created
specifically to encourage national uniformity in law administration.
The Tax Court, for example, is a national court for the resolution of
disputes about application of the tax laws; its judgments (like those of
most administrative agencies) are reviewable in the appellant's local
court of appeals. For Estreicher and Sexton, any difficulty presented by
66. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
67. Id. at 155. Compare Mendoza with United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464
U.S. 165 (1984), decided the same day, in which the government sought to relitigate in
the Sixth Circuit an issue it had lost in litigation against the same private party in the

Tenth and was held bound by the prior result-at least, in the absence of an existing
conflict within the new circuit.
68. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160-63.

69. Id. at 160.
70. Much of the criticism of Mendoza arises out of the unarticulated premise that
Supreme Court correction of error is in fact a reasonable possibility. See, e.g., Note,
Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence, Precluding Government Relitigation in the
Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 847 (1986).
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disagreement between the national Tax Court and the local court of
appeals about the proper reading to be given a provision of the Internal
Revenue Code is resolved by the Tax Court's practice of deciding cases
consistently with the law of the circuit from which the dispute arose. 71
This permits percolation in the years following, as the Tax Court reexamines its position and perhaps seeks to make its own view prevail in
other circuits. While noting the possible invitations for forum shopping and complications for tax planning by particular individuals,
Estreicher and Sexton appear relatively unconcerned with the national
discontinuities thus permitted, namely that percolation may result for a
time in citizens of Alabama paying taxes on a different basis than citizens of California, Minnesota or Rhode Island despite the existence of
a national tribunal capable of avoiding this problem. They do not differentiate this problem from similar intercircuit diversity on questions
that begin in court, and for which the Supreme Court is therefore the
72
only possible unifier.
This brings us to the third and most troubling of the postulated
effects of the Court's limited caseload, nonacquiescence. Here the litigant, for our purposes a government agency, not only continues to act
in other parts of the country in ways a given circuit has found unlawful
(perhaps hoping to generate a conflict among the circuits), but also
continues its behavior within that circuit in all cases other than the particular one adjudicated against it. It accepts finality as to the parties,
but not as to the law, asserting as its justification a competing (and in its
view trumping) programmatic responsibility for uniform national administration of law. This appears truly destructive to the ideal of
agency obedience to law expressed in the hierarchical relationship between agencies and courts. Also, persons living within the circuit can
obtain compliance with circuit precedent only by litigating, a burden of
promoting government legality we ordinarily (and emphatically) think
unjust. 73 Yet the agency position is not without support; its dilemma is
made genuine by a legal obligation of uniformity in administration, and
71. S. Estreicher &J. Sexton, supra note 1, at 57 (citing Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.
742, 757 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971)).
72. In the particular case of tax administration, the equitable argument for uniform
national law seems particularly strong. Yet, it must be conceded that Congress itself did
not clearly adopt this rationale when it created the Tax Court. It also permitted tax
issues to be raised in the Claims Court (with an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) and in the ordinary district courts, albeit with differing procedural arrangements for each. These three systems can be unified only at the Supreme Court.
On other issues, for which Congress has provided only a single, national administrative
adjudicator in preference to the courts, the choice for uniformity seems clear.
73. A House Report deeply critical of the Social Security Administration's nonacquiescence practice excoriated the justice of a "distinction between those beneficiaries
with the resources and fortitude to pursue their claims, and those who accept the government's original denial in good faith or because they lack the means to appeal their
case." H.R. Rep. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1984). Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958) (state officials cannot nullify federal court order); the comparison with
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by its overall responsibility for a program whose full dimensions a particular trial judge or appellate panel is unlikely to understand. The
only source of national law for the agency is the Supreme Court, an authority that in practice-precisely because of its limited resourcescannot often be invoked.
Two agencies are commonly given as examples in the growing and
generally anguished literature about nonacquiescence, 74 although
other examples exist. 75 Fiber Glass Systems, the case briefly discussed
above, 76 involves the first, the National Labor Relations Board. On a
number of matters, the Board has lost an issue in several circuits and
yet maintained its position until a Supreme Court ruling could be
had. 77 Agency decision has often been described as having the greatest
worth on precisely such subjective questions as the one central to Fiber
Glass Systems, the coerciveness of an employer's interrogation; such issues involve inferences likely to be informed both by frequent experience and, more important, by a position on the proper direction of
national labor policy. 78 Although the court's factors appear sensible
enough to one not schooled in labor law, the striking fact is that they
are the court's factors, by which a national program is to be administered
when it touches this court's domain. In this light, "the Board's refusal
to adhere to our guiding precedent, ' 79 while frustrating to the Fifth
Circuit, may not seem surprising. Moreover, the issue here is not simply the NLRB's responsibility for uniform national labor policy. For
the Board, federal venue provisions make review possible in more than
one circuit, so that even if it were disposed to follow the law of the
circuit, it could be hard put to decide, in advance of review having been
state "nullification" of federal law was made explicit in Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432,

1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring).
74. In addition to Note, supra note 70, see Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion
Against the United States Government, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 113 (1984); Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 582 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence]. More open than most to the possibility of a second
side in the nonacquiescence debate is an excellent student work, Note, "Respectful Disagreement": Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States
Courts of Appeals Precedents, 18 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 463 (1985) [hereinafter,
Note, Respectful Disagreement], which conveys a sturdy sense of the frequency of and
reasons for such behavior.
75. The Postal Service appears to have litigated its immunity from state garnishment proceedings at least 20 times in district courts and 10 in the courts of appeals
before the Supreme Court finally decided the issue, Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States
Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 515, 519 n.12 (1984).
76. 807 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1987). See supra note 55 and accompanying text for
discussion of case.
77. Note, Respectful Disagreement, supra note 74, at 480-83.
78. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB
v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 930 (2d Cir. 1967) (HayesJ., dissenting); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank. J., concurring).
79. 807 F.2d at 463.
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obtained, just which circuit's law that would be.80
The second example is the Department of Health and Human
Services' administration of disability insurance, which generated tremendous controversy during President Reagan's first term. The Department refused to acquiesce in particular views of governing law on
which it had repeatedly lost in reviewing courts.8 1 The Department
does not share the Board's venue problems, but does face a major administrative challenge. Its implementing statute specifically requires8 it
2
to assure uniform national administration of the disability program;
indeed, we would expect a reviewing court to reverse unexplained departures from uniformity. The Department's task is complicated by the
need to supervise and guide a complex bureaucracy of state as well as
federal officials. Whatever one thinks of its particular performance in
the face of repeated losses on the issue in question,8 3 one can understand that the Department faces a genuine dilemma. Varying instructions from different courts of appeals not only interfere with the
instruction to achieve uniformity, but also make it more difficult for the
agency to manage its own resources and to guide and motivate the
enormous bureaucracy for which it is responsible.8 4 Rarely able to secure the intervention of the Court, such an agency is torn between implementing its own views with uniformity (at the cost of ignoring one or
80. Venue for review might have been placed elsewhere: in the D.C. Circuit, or in
any other circuit in which Fiber Glass Systems did business. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (0
(1982); see Note, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, supra note 74, at 604-05.
81. The circuits ruled that disability benefits could not be terminated unless the
government produced evidence of material medical improvement. Note, Respectful
Disagreement, supra note 74, at 477-80. The Social Security Administration's policy
placed it in conflict on one issue with every circuit court but one (which had not ruled),
and with several circuits on another issue. H.R. Rep. No. 618, supra note 73, at 24.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(2) (1982).
83. Professor Wechsler remarked in addressing a related problem,
When [the chance for an overruling] has been exploited and has run its course,
with reaffirmation rather than reversal of decision, has not the time arrived
when its acceptance is demanded, without insisting on repeated litigation?
The answer here, it seems to me, must be affirmative, both as the necessary
implication of our constitutional tradition and to avoid the greater evils that
will otherwise ensue.
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1008 (1965).
84. J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims
(1983) elegantly describes the dimensions, successes, failures and dilemmas of the bureaucratic system, stressing the importance of its morale in a unified task.
Note that while Congress agreed with the courts of appeals in 1984 about the specific matter respecting which the Department was then pursuing its nonacquiescence
policy, Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98
Stat. 1794 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1984)), it failed to adopt proposed measures to
eliminate or regulate the nonacquiescence generally. Cautioning against any inference
that it approved of nonacquiescence, a conference committee reported finding "legal
and Constitutional issues" that "can only be settled by the Supreme Court." H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984). The committee noted a "congressional
intent that the Secretary resolve policy conflicts promptly in order to achieve consistent
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more courts of appeals) and administering national law with geographical variation in a way that violates its statutory obligation, complicates
its administrative problems and, in an important sense, takes policy responsibility from it.
The difficulty here springs from an unresolved tension between
two forms of organization for the resolution of legal questions, national
and geographical. The geographical organization of the federal courts
is, of course, only one choice. It may be compelled in a few respectsfor example, by the sixth amendment's requirement that criminal trials
(but not appeals) occur in the vicinity of the crime. In other respects,
however, the use of geography suggests choices about what characteristics seem most important in courts: that they be generalist rather than
specialist institutions; that they be located where the users are; that they
reflect to some degree the political tone of their community.8 5 Like the
Tax Court or the Claims Court, both of which entertain disputes arising
throughout the country, a system of federal trial courts could be organized along subject-matter lines. Like the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or the D.C. Circuit for a limited number of agencies and
issues, subject-matter organization of appellate jurisdiction could also
be provided. In the ordinary case, however, geographical organization
86
is the choice we make.
When one takes the federal administrative agencies to be a part of
the judicial pyramid,8 7 one sees that in fact the principle of specialist
uniform administration of the program" that would be better served by seeking
Supreme Court review or legislative revision than relitigation. Id. at 37-38.
Subsequently, the Secretary adopted a new procedure under which state officials
would be instructed to act in accordance with uniform national standards, irrespective of
circuit law; departmental administrative law judges, however, would be instructed to apply circuit law to any proceedings brought before them, flagging cases in which that
would produce results inconsistent with departmental policy; and the Department's Appeals Council would then consider, in each such case, whether to acquiesce in the circuit's law or to persist in departmental policy. See Judicial Review of Agency Action:
HHS Policy of Nonacquiescence, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Gov'tal Rel. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 8-9 (1985).
85. See R. Posner, supra note 1, at 156. The appointment process, as it works in
fact, provides this element. The requirement that district judges reside in their district,
and the involvement of state senatorial delegations in appointments to both the district
courts and the courts of appeals, assure that federal judges for courts in all but the
politically powerless (and nationally important) District of Columbia will be named from
the communities where they are expected to sit.
86. See R. Posner, supra note 1, at 147. Compare id. with Griswold, supra note 7,
at 65-66 (proposing additional specialist courts).
87. Whether agencies should be regarded as being in formal terms a part of the
judiciary (or either of the other two branches of government) is of course an arguable
proposition. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place of
Agencies]. They are often enough referred to as article I courts. See, e.g., Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting). More recently, in Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 106 S.Ct.
3245 (1986), Justice O'Connor described them as "non-Article III tribunals." Id. at
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organization is very frequently employed. Three propositions seem unexceptionable: that agency adjudication substitutes for adjudication
that could otherwise be assigned the geographically organized courts;
that in choosing to make that substitution, Congress has empowered
centralized, national determination of any legal or policy questions at
issue; and that the nearly universal provisions that Congress has made
for judicial review of agency adjudication transfer to the courts some
part of the obligation to produce consistent and coherent results in the
areas of the agencies' responsibility. In this sense, one can see that
Congress has frequently chosen subject-matter specialization as the
principle of organization for the initial adjudication of matters falling
within the Supreme Court's ultimate responsibility for the coherence of
national law. And the demands of uniformity and of hierarchical obedience simply cannot be reconciled below the Supreme Court level.
While nonacquiescence is an unsettling response to the tension between geographically organized courts and specialist agencies, alternative approaches have their problems as well. Thus, it is too simple to
ascribe one's reaction just to agency behavior (refusing to be bound,
nationally, by an adverse ruling in one circuit), and to deny the existence ofjudicial elements. If the agency is dissatisfied with the law pronounced as national law, this argument would go, it should seek
Supreme Court review. At the least, it must accept potential geographical diversity in the law it administers as the cost of its own unwillingness to take (or failure in taking) that step. It should be apparent,
however, that one consequence of the Supreme Court's limited resources is that the agency cannot expect a prompt national resolution
of its problem. Consequently it is misleading to fault the agency on this
account.
Simply accepting the first court of appeals ruling is no more appropriate. Such an approach would not be consistent with the agency's
responsibility, for it assumes that the decision of one point of law is an
3260. And see Sommer, Independent Agencies as Article One Tribunals: Foundations
of a Theory of Agency Independence, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 83 (1987). On some occasions
they have been talked about as if an even stronger, adjunct relationship to the article III
courts were required. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 509 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches]. Yet they are in the same sense article I executives and (the metaphor breaks
down here) article I legislators.
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or
quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions
within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat
to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw over
our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Whatever
formal definition of governmental structure is employed, however, their place in the
pyramid seems secure.
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isolated, independent rule to which the agency can easily conform. But
the programs for which an agency is responsible are more aptly viewed
as a fabric, within which a decision on any given issue is likely to have
implications for aspects not directly involved. 88 Integration of the
whole, even so preliminary a matter as a comprehensive view of the
whole, is the agency's continuing responsibility. The episodic intervention of a particular panel of three of the nation's 156 circuit judges,
pressed to decide a particular point on particular facts, is unlikely to
generate an integrated view. If it cannot be pretended that the panel
will have either the perspective or the responsibility for integration,
then accepting its ruling as a definitive point that must be accommodated is inviting a crazy and tattered quilt. From this perspective, a
formal policy of nonaquiescence is an understandable outcome.
Yet another alternative would be to substitute a specialist court,
like the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a body that appears to
have been dramatically successful in restoring discipline to the resolution of patent issues. Often discussed, in particular, are the possible
advantages of a special national tribunal for disability cases. 89 Specialist organization, however, would introduce its own distortions, as the
experience of the agencies themselves attests. While structured to provide uniform resolutions of the particular questions within their authority, they are also (by the very reason of their specialization) less capable
of grasping the larger context within which those questions arise. In
grappling with broad legal issues outside their particular responsibility,
they face significant handicaps. In addition to their obvious inexperience with these questions, the agencies' daily focus on specialist issues
and their natural disposition to regard such issues as centrally important can give them a distorted perspective. Agencies face larger risks of
politicization, and are less likely to take a sympathetic view of those
citizen claims that are opposed to the achievement of programmatic
goals. 90 The Merit Systems Protection Board, reviewable only in the
Federal Circuit, is not often reversed there 9 1-perhaps evidence of the
success of that court's guidance, or of a civil service system that is capable of disciplining only the most unfit of public servants; but perhaps,
also, an indication ofjust this problem. Our preference for having the
88. Consider, as one example, an agency with finite resources presented with a judicial order requiring consumption of some of those resources-say, to analyze an issue
or even to report its findings in a more elaborate way than the agency itself would
choose to do. Cf. Fiber Glass Sys. v. NLRB, 807 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1987) (establishing
elaborate criteria for determining employer coercion). It can spend those resources here,
only at the cost of withdrawing them from use there. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821 (1985) (limiting judicial review of agency inaction partly in deference to agency
resource allocation prerogatives).
89. See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches, supra note 87, at 505 n.78.
90. See R. Posner, supra note 1, at 147-60.
91. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., Study of MSPB Appeals Decisions for
FY1985 4 (1986) (94% of decisions sustained).
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courts perform the larger functions of integration within the legal system is solidly based in this reality. Unavoidably, each style of organization, geographical and specialist, presents its own risks to the
uniformity and coherence of national law.
Nor is it reasonable to expect that these problems can be cured at
the source by more proficient legislation. 9 2 As the legal system increasingly becomes the complex product of a torrent of politically generated
statutes and rules, the idea that its elements are coherent-in-fact, never
more than an aspiration, becomes indefensible. It is unrealistic to expect legislatures to be aware of all that has gone before; legislative purpose to create new institutions and rules compatible with the existing
body of law is a fictive construct. Legislators deal with the problem at
hand, on the basis of such information and experience as they can readily garner, and notably free of any significant obligation to achieve coherence. At best, one can think them willing to have the courts pick up
the pieces and attempt to put them into an appropriate shape. 93 Moreover, to the extent Congress is aware of the need for the coordinating
and unifying functions its own processes have not permitted, it often
places (or tolerates the assumption of) responsibility for significant aspects of those functions elsewhere. With the continuing growth of executive, regulatory government, the judiciary's responsibility for the
overall shape of the legal order has been correspondingly diminished.
The point here is not that we should not be troubled by the Court's
explicit endorsement of percolation and the implicit approval that this
carries for nonacquiescence. These are troubling developments for a
nation committed, as ours is, to the rule of law. The point is rather that
we have yet to come to grips with the problem of which these developments are merely a symptom. The simple response of the most outspoken critics of nonacquiescence-that the government's only proper
recourse to a disappointing legal outcome lies in the Supreme Courtfails to account for the unavailability of that remedy, for the resulting
incentives to disorder in the courts of appeals, and for the agencies'
law-driven reasons for resisting the episodic and irresponsible 94 interventions of geographically limited intermediate courts in the programs
for which they bear national responsibility. As United States v. Mendoza 95
makes clear, these developments are a natural outcome of the Supreme
Court's current dilemma in managing national law.
92. See Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 1.

93. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), is one eloquent example. R. Katzmann, Institutional Disability: The Saga of Transportation Policy for the Disabled (1986), details another.
94. That is, the courts are not responsible for overall administration of programs,
as agencies are, but only for the just outcome of the particular case before them-a case
whose equities and presentation may be dramatically distorting of the program as a
whole.
95. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).

1987]

IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITED RESOURCES
IV.

1117
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If the Supreme Court's limited resources make it incapable of itself
remedying all the distortions introduced into national law by the competition between geographical and specialist institutions, one might expect to see the development of rules that put aside the usual dominance
of the geographical units, the courts, when specialist decisions seem
more likely to produce uniformity and coherence. If the Court cannot
itself control the system, that is, perhaps it can manage the system by
allocating functions between agencies and courts so as to reduce the
chance that the lower courts will introduce undesirable geographical
diversity into national law, thus reducing the number of occasions when
the Court must intervene. It will be required to police only the understanding of this allocational rule, not particular outcomes.
Recent changes in the Court's approaches to the use and interpretation of statutes might be understood in just this way. These changes
include an increased reluctance to use regulatory statutes as the basis
for inferring new federal judicial causes of action;9 6 new stress on the
words of statutes as primary sources of meaning;9 7 reliance on the
"complexity" of federal regulation as a basis for judicial reluctance to
intervene; 98 and, perhaps especially, the recently stated requirement
that lower courts accept an agency's interpretation of its constitutive
statute if Congress cannot be said "directly" to have anticipated and
resolved the matter and if the agency's interpretation is a "reasonable"
one.99
For students of administrative law, the last of these developments-signaled by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. 0 0-has seemed to create a curious tension in the Court's jurisprudence concerning judicial review of
administrative action. While this decision appears to direct courts away
from a function they perform particularly well, determining issues of
law, the Court's decision in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' 0 1 just one year earlier, had endorsed quite aggressive review of agency reasoning as a general matter.
This "hard-look review," some believe, invites courts to perform a
96. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979) (no congressional intent to allow private remedy under § 17(a) of the Securi-

ties and Exchange Act of 1934); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979) (no private remedy under § 206 of Investment Advisors Act of 1940); see

also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (recounting
development of doctrine).
97. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892 (1982).
98. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984).

99. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).

100. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
101. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1093

function they cannot carry out well, one that threatens judicial usurpation of what is properly for the agency. The Court has gotten it backwards, they say; it should aggressively review legal issues and defer on
policy questions. 10 2 Viewing the two cases from a managerial perspective, however, suggests a resolution of this seeming paradox. Hardlook review of particular outcomes can be thought to promote adherence to law, while presenting less danger of generating unmanageable
incoherence than does judicial review of statutory meaning.
A. Chevron v. NRDC: Giving Up the Illusion of Statutory Precision
A good example of the workings of an allocational rule, although
not a rule concerned with promoting the coherence and uniformity of
national law as such, can be found in the requirement that courts of
appeals uphold agency decisions reached in on-the-record proceedings
if those decisions are supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 103 and a limited number
of later cases, the Supreme Court explained how this substantial evidence test was to be understood. It did not, however, ever seek itself to
apply that rule-to determine whether substantial evidence did, or did
not, support a particular agency decision. It is well understood at the
Supreme Court bar that an asserted error in result in applying the substantial evidence test will never be considered a sufficient basis for
granting a writ of certiorari, however clear the error or important the
outcome. What must be shown to gain the writ is that the court of
appeals misunderstood the test-that it articulated its general responsibilities in a manner inconsistent with the Court's explanations. Misapplication of the test to particular circumstances does not suffice.
This allocational function of some Supreme Court decisions is suggested by its otherwise somewhat surprising Chevron ruling. A statute
empowered the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt regulations
governing the emission of air-borne pollutants. The EPA adopted a
regulation that, among its provisions, permitted a large factory site to
treat all of its emissions as if they emanated from a single source (a
"bubble") rather than having to control its emissions smokestack by
smokestack, as some argued must be done. The Court concluded that
the statute empowering the agency to regulate was entirely unclear
whether agency use of the bubble concept had been authorized; it
could be read in either way, and the history of the statute was
inconclusive. 104
102. Judge Steven Breyer of the First Circuit is an especially articulate proponent
of this view. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.
Rev. 363 (1986); see also the works cited infra note 164.
103. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
104. When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
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The Court might have reacted to this conceded legislative failure
by disapproving the agency's action-saying, for example, that the
agency's authority was not sufficiently clear to uphold it. Or it might
itself have resolved the disputed question of statutory meaning, so that
it could be known for the future whether the bubble approach was or
was not to be used. These two choices had faced the Court when it
reviewed two OSHA rulemaking proceedings early in the 1980s. 10 5 In
those cases, the Court had chosen to construe the statute itself rather
than find an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the agency.
Justice Stevens, as author of the plurality opinion in the first of those
cases, in effect set that style.
In Chevron, however, with Justice Stevens now writing for a unanimous (but somewhat depleted) Court,' 0 6 the Justices made neither of
these choices. Instead, their opinion stressed the range of discretion
agencies may be recognized to have.' 0 7 The Justices agreed that the
power to construe the statute lay in the agency. The courts were required
to accept the reading of the statute that the agency had chosen, so long
as it lay within the bounds of linguistic possibility, purpose, and reason
(as this reading did).10 8 Implicit in this judgment was the proposition
that if, at some future point, the agency changed to another reading of
the statute that also met these tests, that reading too would have to be
accepted. Thus, the Court appears to have recognized as valid a delegation to the agency of authority to determine, within bounds, the
meaning of the statute itself.'0 9
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. See infra note 107.
105. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
106. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor did not participate.
107. Thus, the Court continued from the sentences quoted supra note 104:
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on
the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
108. "In these cases the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed
and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies." Id. at
865.
109. When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituencyhave a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving
the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial
ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
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This insistence that the agency's reading of the statute be accepted,
if reasonable, may seem surprising in light of a line the Supreme Court
often quotes from its early, and foundational, decision about judicial
review, Marbury v. Madison:1 0 "It is emphatically the province and duty
' ' From
of the judicial department to say what the law is.
time to
time, the Court has even suggested that courts have plenary authority
to determine legal questions as a matter of constitutional necessity." 12
As a statutory matter, it is unmistakably endorsed by the language of
section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which sets the general
standards for judicial review of administrative action.' 13 Both the preamble to section 706 and its paragraphs 2(B), 2(C), and 2(D) stress the
primacy and independence of judicial judgment on questions of law.
In a formal sense, the Chevron approach can be reconciled with this
traditional judicial primacy. The process of independent review itself is
what may lead a court to conclude that a given statute places in an
agency, to some extent, the responsibility to say what the statute
means. It is the court, not the agency, that decides when and under
what constraints such authority has been conferred. This analysis, however, better explains earlier cases of this character, such as NLRB v.
Hearst Publications,Inc.. 114 The Court concluded that the particular statute in question in Hearst commanded agency responsibility for interpretation (within limits) of the statutory language at issue. Chevron appears
to reach this conclusion as a general imperative of judicial behavior,
unconnected to congressional wishes reflected in any given law.
Moreover, it should be apparent that any such conclusion crosses a
significant threshold. In the usual setting in which courts talk about
deferring or attaching weight to agency judgments about statutes, the
court seeks guidance from administrative conduct, yet nonetheless remains responsible for deciding the meaning of the statutory language
in question. ' 5 The question of meaning is then fixed by the court's
decision, unless later reexamined by another court or by the legislature.
Under the Chevron approach, what appears as a question of statutory
interpretation is given to the agency. Judicial review is limited to deterId. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
110. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
111. Id. at 177.
112. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). Whether this aspect of
Crowell has survived the Court's recent decisions in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 106 S.Ct. 3245 (1986), is open to some question. See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches, supra note 87, at 524-26; Bruff, The Constitutionality of Arbitration
in Federal Programs (on file at the Columbia Law Review).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1980).
114. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
115. Skidmore v.Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 325 (1933); SEC v.Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2d
Cir. 1935).
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mining whether the choice it has made is a "reasonable" one, and other
"reasonable" choices remain available to the agency if it decides to pur116
sue them in the future.
The suggestion here is that it is helpful to view Chevron through the
lens of the Supreme Court's severely restricted capacity directly to enforce uniformity upon the courts of appeals in those courts' review of
agency decisionmaking. When national uniformity in the administration of national statutes is called for, the national agencies responsible
for that administration can be expected to reach single readings of the
statutes for which they are responsible and to enforce those readings
within their own framework. A demonstrated failure to do so would
itself be grounds for reversal on judicial review. If, however, one accepts not only that language is imprecise, but also that congressional
language (in particular) is frequently indeterminate,"1 7 it follows that

that reading could never be demonstrably correct, but merely reasonable if within the range of indeterminacy, or incorrect if beyond it. Any
reviewing panel of judges from one of the twelve circuits, if made responsible for precise renditions of statutory meaning, could vary in its
judgment from the agency's, and from the judgments of other panels in
other circuits, without being wrong.' 18 The variance might even occur
in predictable ways, if simple diversity were overlaid by geographical
bias. The Supreme Court's practical inability in most cases to give its
own precise renditions of statutory meaning virtually assures that circuit readings will be diverse. 19 By removing the responsibility for precision from the courts of appeals, the Chevron rule subdues this
diversity, and thus enhances the probability of uniform national administration of the laws.
Rather than see Chevron just as a rule about agency discretion, in
other words, it can be seen as a device for managing the courts of appeals that can reduce (although not eliminate) the Supreme Court's
need to police their decisions for accuracy. The tendency produced by
116. See generally Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133

U. Pa. L. Rev. 549 (1985) (usefully framing these issues in terms of comparative
competence).
117. The Chevron opinion is dramatic in its acceptance of these propositions:
Congress ... [did not legislate] on the level of specificity presented by these
cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the
balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to
do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps
Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and
those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
467 U.S. at 865; see also Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 1, at 1420-24.
118. See State Dep't of Ins. v. Insurance Serv. Office, 434 So. 2d 908, 927-29 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Smith, J. dissenting).
119. Cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559 n.6 (1980) (vague
statute interpreted many ways by appellate courts).
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having courts in Maine, Florida and California each believe that, absent
clear statutory resolution of an issue, it must accept the Administrator's
"reasonable" judgments about statutory meaning is to make it more
likely that the statute will have the same effective meaning in each circuit. First, judges are more likely to reach agreement in identifying a
range of indeterminacy that Congress did in fact create, than they are in
searching vainly for a specific answer that Congress did not provide.
Beyond that, even assuming that the ranges of indeterminacy identified
by a series of differing panels will vary in some particulars, one now has
the potential for overlap. An agency's judgment may be able to satisfy
all the varying but overlapping courts of appeals' ranges, as it could not
fit all the varying courts of appeals' efforts at precise readings. In crude
geometrical terms, the agency's point of judgment may well fall on all
of a series of lines identified by the courts of appeals as the range of
indeterminacy though it could not coincide with more than one of a
varying series of courts of appeals points. Freed by Chevron from the
diversity of point judgments that could prompt its own need to intervene, the Supreme Court may find it sufficient, as in Universal Camera,
simply to assure itself that the rule of approach has been
understood. 120
This view of Chevron, finally, makes possible more careful assessment of nonacquiescence. While nonacquiescence may have some intuitive force for an agency faced with a court decision that it is wrong
under a precise decision model, it seems far less acceptable if a court
has found an agency's interpretation to be beyond the zone of
reasonableness.
B. Some Implications of Giving Up the Illusion of Statutory Precision
Chevron's premises about the legislative process and the possibilities of point judgment seem relevant to the general question of statutory interpretation as well as to the special case in which an agency is
available to make the first choice among the reasonable possibilities of
meaning left open by Congress' words. That Congress may not have
120. This is not to suggest that the analogy is a comfortable one. The substantial
evidence test concerns appellate review for factual error. Few other than the losing
party will care if the Supreme Court does not review a circuit court decision to see
whether there actually was or was not "substantial evidence" in the record.
But Chevron cases involve more than the particular dispute before the court on this
one occasion. Even granting the fact of statutory indeterminacy and the presence of a
healthy admixture of program-oriented policy judgment, the issues resolved in a case
like Chevron have the generality of application we ordinarily associate with questions of
law. To think that the Supreme Court will - or must - disengage itself from review of
such issues, except to the extent of determining whether the lower appellate court properly understood the methodological formula for engaging in this legal inquiry, is disturbing. It in effect removes the Court from the business it has identified as the most
important "province and duty of the judicial department." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
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"directly addressed the precise question at issue,"' 121 so that a statute's
meaning may be indeterminate, is a realistic assessment for all questions of statutory meaning. Pretending that statutory meanings are
congressionally fixed may appear to solve some problems in the relationship between legislature and court: it fixes the courts in an apparently subservient role and operates as an ostensible check upon judicial
subjectivity. Whether this discipline on their relationship is real or
merely apparent, 1 22 and whether if real it is wise, 123 are themselves
valid questions. Assume that courts understand and experience some
check on their freedom of decision, however, and the approach has
costs, perceptible in recent decades, of inviting unwanted behavior in
the legislative realm. The courts have begun to express realistic concern that, with the growth of congressional staff, the materials courts
commonly rely on for legislative history are being manipulated for ef12 4
fect by these and other persons, having no claim to legislative voice.
A perceptive student note, published two years before Chevron,
spoke of a new tone of literalism in Supreme Court statute reading and
the problems it connoted for those settings where literalism could provide no sensible answer. 125 The Chevron two-stage analysis suggests a
line of response to these concerns that also may reduce the urgency for
Court intervention when the courts of appeals disagree within the area
of indeterminacy. Giving up the idea of attributing a precise answer to
Congress in all statutory interpretation, of course, will not produce uni121. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
122. See Note, supra note 97, at 902-03 (collecting sources).
123. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 182 (1982)
(endorsing judicial updating of obsolete statutes).
124. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The problem could be conceptualized as the congressional equivalent of the Court's, with its roots also in the tremendous expansion of
the nation's legal agenda and governmental apparatus over the past decades. Congressional committee staff that in the 1940s numbered in the hundreds, now is well into the
thousands; twice as many serve on personal staffs. Thus, the legislative process, like the
judicial, has become bureaucratized, perhaps even more so. M. Malbin, Unelected Representatives 240, 242-44 (1980). We know that the image of the elected legislator debating and persuading her fellows, or even reasoning with her elected colleagues over the
contents of a pending committee report, is no longer accurate. Bureaucrats and lobbyists produce those reports; the debates are often scripted for their future influence on
courts (or voters) rather than for present persuasion of colleagues. The time of members of Congress, too, has been exhausted by the demands placed on it; and it should
not be surprising to find courts slowly taking note of the resulting changes and attendant
risks for the manipulation of their own processes.
125. Note, supra note 97. The Note placed the trend as a reaction to a "golden
rule" of statutory interpretation associated with H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process
(tent. ed. 1958), seeking coherence through judicial explication of "what meaning ought
to be given to the directions of the statute" as a function of the problem it addresses, its
general purpose, its relation to the larger body of law, and so forth. Note, supra note
97, at 893. The author saw this approach as pro-regulatory, and suggested that the
renewed emphasis on "clear statement" could be understood both as defusing judicial
power and as generally deregulatory, protective of individual autonomy. Id. at 910-12.
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formity; once the Second and Seventh Circuits decide that Congress
has not directly spoken on the issue, each will be free to go its individual ways unless checked by the Court. But the question is now reduced,
in essence, to one of common law.
So conceptualizing the question in the first instance would be
healthy in its candor. It would acknowledge the reality that for some
purposes statutes will be indeterminate. Within the zone of indeterminacy, it would invite courts to respond from their strengths, building on
all the matters that common-law courts commonly take into account:
What are the strong policies available for judgment? (The statute will
provide the bulk of them.) What are the possible implications ofjudgment, one way or another, for future behavior? What is the force of the
particular facts that have generated the particular dispute?
Moreover, this realism about what the courts are doing within the
zone of indeterminacy should change the prospects for Supreme Court
review when a conflict among the circuits develops. One may ask why a
court any more than an agency is bound to create a fixed solution
within that zone. Acknowledging that legislative imprecision creates
settings within which solutions must be found by experience and approximation turns diversity of result from undoubted cost to possible
benefit. Even the congressional choice to leave working out the solution to the geographically dispersed courts rather than to a national
agency can be seen in some respects as a legislative statement about the
relative importance of uniformity. The Supreme Court should tolerate
the gradual accretion of circuit interpretations of indeterminate statutes, focusing its attention instead on lower court diversity about issues
on which Congress appears to have "directly spoken." Again, this view
reduces the need for the Court to exercise direct control.
None of this, of course, suggests that it will always be easy to apply
the two-stage Chevron analysis. At the first stage, in particular, judges
may disagree whether "traditional tools of statutory construction" reveal that "Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue."' 2 6 Some evidence of this problem appears in the Supreme
Court's closely divided decision this spring in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca.127 The question there was whether two
statutory standards in the Refugee Act of 1980 were identical in their
meaning, as the Bureau of Immigration Appeals had decided. Justice
Stevens, writing for a bare majority of five, undertook a lengthy analysis
of legislative history as well as text to demonstrate that, as a matter of
congressional purpose, the two standards were not identical. Justice
Scalia, concurring, insisted that the Court's reference to the legislative
history was uncalled for, that it should return to use of a plain meaning
approach to statutory language: "Judges interpret laws rather than re126. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
127. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
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construct legislators' intentions."1 28 Justice Powell, for himself, the
ChiefJustice and Justice White, found the BIA's action to be within the
area of indeterminacy, and, in effect reaching Chevron's second stage,
' 29
said its action was "reasonable."'
The dispute between Justices Stevens and Scalia concerned the intensity of the first-stage Chevron review and highlights an important potential for confusion on the question whether and to what extent
deference is owed to agency views. The traditional tools of statutory
construction have long included reliance (among other indications of
meaning) on agency constructions given the statute in other proceedings-as, for example, in litigation under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.13 0 Like the testimony of involved executive branch officials at congressional hearings'' or the initial interpretations given a statute by
the responsible agency,' 3 2 an agency interpretation that has remained
consistent over the years can plausibly be regarded as evidence of what
is assumed to be a determinate congressional meaning, one to be found
out by the courts.
At one point in his argument, responding to a government argument for deference to an INS conclusion that the two terms at issue had
identical meaning, Justice Stevens remarked:
An additional reason for rejecting the Government's request
for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of
the positions the BIA has taken through the years. An agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the
agency's earlier interpretation is "entitled to considerably
less
13 3
deference" than a consistently held agency view.
This is a perfectly orthodox and valid argument at the first, judicially
dominated stage of Chevron review. In that context, one can sensibly
speak of giving the agency interpretation special weight as an indicator
of congressional meaning and of giving it less deference when the
agency's interpretation has been inconsistent.
The quoted language is not a proper argument, however, once a
court has concluded that a statute lacks determinate meaning in some
respect and thus has reached Chevron's second stage. The very meaning
of the second stage, emphasized in Chevron, is that within the zone of
indeterminacy, an agency is free to change its view-and the obligation
of the courts to accept the changed view is not altered by the fact of the
change.' 3 4 One senses that Justice Scalia's strong reaction to the elab128. Id. at 1224 (ScaliaJ., concurring).

129. Id. at 1225 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also Lukhard v.
Reed, 107 S.Ct. 1807 (1987) (a contemporary example in the AFDC context).
131. See, e.g., SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1935).
132. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
133. 107 S. Ct. at 1221 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981) and
citing other cases).
134. The possibility that some persons may have acted in reliance on an established
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orateness of the majority's first-stage analysis was animated in good
part by fears that use of agency views as an element in determining
whether there exists a determinate congressional meaning, however
conventional, would threaten continued acceptance of the second-stage
proposition. The problem lies in the use of the word "deference" to
describe what is to occur at the second stage. That usage suggests an
ultimate judicial responsibility for the outcome that the analysis in Chevron in other respects repudiates. Acceptance subject to reasonableness
review, not deference, is the necessary posture here. A change not well
explained might be rejected as unreasonable and returned to the
agency for further consideration; but one would never reach the point
at which a court, declining to defer to the agency's view, supplied its
own meaning for the statute. 135
C. Promoting Coherence: Understanding Complex and Interrelated Schemes
The Supreme Court may be allocating functions to agencies and
reducing the role of lower courts not only to preserve uniformity in
federal law, but also to ensure effective enforcement of complex statutes. 13 6 Here one can compare the sporadic and case-specific character
of judicial encounters with issues of statutory meaning, with an
agency's continuing responsibilities and policy-implementing perspectives. Just as the generalist courts have particular strengths in dealing
with issues, such as constitutional questions, that involve integration
between an agency's specialty and the general legal structure, agencies
are especially well-placed to appreciate the interrelationships of issues
and the impacts of alternative approaches within the framework of statutes specifically under their charge. Courts lack responsibility for the
general success of the statutory scheme; they are, of necessity, focused
on individual rights rather than on the functioning of the system. The
more complex the statutory scheme and the more intricate the interrelationships, the larger the risks detailed judicial involvement will
present. From this perspective, it is significant that Chevron arose in the
interpretation suggests a fairness reason for courts to preclude at least retroactive application of a changed view. But for his conclusion that this factor was present, it is hard to
makeJustice Stevens' lone dissent from Commissioner v. Fink, 107 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 n.7
(1987), consistent with his Chevron opinion, 467 U.S. at 837. Tax cases, as Fink was, do
occur in a context marked by both unusually active congressional oversight and a strong
need for confident forward planning by affected individuals; yet this does not preclude a
future-regarding change of view by Treasury officials of the appropriate interpretation
of a less than clear statute. See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100-01
(1939).
135. An indication of possible court of appeals confusion respecting Chevron and
Cardoza-Fonsecaappears in two very recent D.C. Circuit opinions. American Mining Congress v. EPA, No. 85-1206, slip. op. at 4 (D.C. Cir.July 31, 1987) (Mikva, J., dissenting);
Union of Concerned Scientists v. N.R.C., No. 85-1757, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Aug 4,
1987) (Williams, J., concurring).
136. On the themes of this section, see especially their elegant treatment in Diver,
supra note 116.
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context of environmental regulation, an area generally characterized by
statutes of substantially greater complexity and technical detail than
those of an earlier generation. In such cases, a judge's limited resources, his only occasional opportunities to seek understanding, and
the often distorting character of the litigation perspective relative to
administration, 13 7 can lead him to fear that his decision will be more
disruptive than helpful to the statutory scheme.
Similarly, lower courts may introduce unruly elements into national law administration by implying a common-law judicial remedy
for behavior that seems also to be the subject of agency regulation. Not
so long ago, implication of such remedies was viewed as the paradigmatic contribution of a common-law court and was actively encouraged
in the federal context by the Supreme Court. Along with active development of tort liability for governmental officials under the twin heads
of the Civil Rights Statute for state officials' 3 8 and the constitutional
tort theory of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of
Narcotics'3 9 for federal officials, the Court appeared to invite lower federal courts to imply private tort remedies parallel and supplementary to
the administrative remedies of regulatory statutes. 140 To create such
private rights of action, lower courts did not need to find specific congressional expectation or intent, but merely that "damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive
1 41
provisions of the statute."
Recent years have seen a striking retrenchment from this expansive
view,' 4 2 along with some hesitation about the Civil Rights Act' 4 3 and
137. By and large, litigation presents only a parade of the most dissatisfied. When
the administration of disability insurance laws is at its most successful, for example, its
errors will be concentrated around the line of hard judgment; persons close to the line,
but denied benefits, will have the largest motivation to seek judicial review. Judges will
then face a series of appealing denials of benefits (that is what "close to the line" means)
without ever seeing or being asked to correct the agency's equally (and marginally)
questionable grants of benefits, or to evaluate the agency's performance systemically-in
such terms as the avoidance of gross error, balance at the margin, and so forth. See J.
Mashaw, supra note 84.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

139. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
140. See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
141. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433. As Justice Harlan later remarked on citing this passage
in his separate opinion in the Bivens case, "[t]he exercise of judicial power involved in
Borak simply cannot be justified in terms of statutory construction, .. . nor did the Borak
Court purport to do so.... The notion of 'implying' a remedy, therefore.., can only
refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally
availablejudicial remedies according to reasons related to the substantive social policy
embodied in an act of positive law." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402-03 n.4 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
142. See cases supra note 96.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See in particular Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981), stressing the general complexity and sensitivity of the comprehensive regulatory enforcement scheme at issue; see
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Bivens 14 4 remedies. This retrenchment is easily enough seen as an expression of the conservatism and deregulatory bent of the times, and as
reflecting a loss of confidence in the common-law generative capacities
of courts. 145 However, one might also find two other specific and related contributors to this phenomenon: first, an understanding that a
common-law process for generating national remedial standards is impaired by the Court's inability to speak with frequency as the national
body responsible for coordinating those standards; second, a developing realization that, in particular, judicial lawmaking can serve as a disruptive force when it occurs circuit by circuit, in competition with
agencies that are able to generate national standards. The Court's negative expressions about implying remedies, along with other surprising
refusals to extend traditional forms of judicial relief,14 6 consistently
draw support from perceptions of the complexity or elaborateness of
the administrative scheme. Strikingly, the Court does not suggest that
an agency must take the same conservative attitude towards its authority; Chevron 14 7 is precisely the contrary, encouraging agencies to treat
their enabling statutes as constitutions even as it instructs the courts to
step back. 148
generally Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 394 (1982) (discussing when the creation of a statutory enforcement mechanism preempts usual operation of § 1983).
144. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), is particularly
suggestive for the current discussion. The Bush Court refused to imply a Bivens remedy
for alleged first amendment violations by a federal supervisor in demoting a federal
employee, in the presence of statutory remedies for wrongful demotion under the Civil
Service Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7514 (1987). Acknowledging that the Civil Service Act
itself did not answer the question whether a judicial remedy should be implied, the
Court found its reason not to make the implication in the existence of "an elaborate
remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations." Id. at 388. Judicial improvisation-with, one might add,
its inevitable variability in administration from place to place-presented risks to "the
efficiency of the civil service" that the Court could not effectively assess; "we are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest
would be served by creating [an auxiliary judicial remedy]." Id. at 389-90.
145. See, e.g., Note, supra note 97.
146. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348 (1984) (barring consumer suits on federal milk marketing program, as they would "disrupt [a] complex and
delicate administrative scheme").
147. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
148. Thus, the attitude toward development of the law expressed inJ.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and subsequently rejected for the courts in Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), and its sequelae, see supra note 96, seems just the attitude Chevron requires courts to respect in agencies. The contrast interestingly appears concerning the
Food and Drug Administration, in Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 177, 179 (1973) ("that Congress simply has not considered or spoken on a particular issue certainly is no bar to the
Food and Drug Administration exerting initiative and leadership in the public interest")
and Austern, Philosophy of Regulation: A Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 Food Drug Cosm. LJ.
189, 192 (1973) ("as a lawyer I look at Section 301 to see what Congress has specifically
made a prohibited act").
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Perhaps one ought to understand these opinions as statements
about judicial capacity rather than (or as well as) legislative purpose.
What is important is not merely that by providing one forum for relief
Congress has implicitly excluded others, but that the complexity of the
scheme may lead the Court to fear that a judicial remedy would block
rather than effectuate congressional policy. The Court presents the judiciary as the bull in the legal china shop, that may clumsily interfere
with the attainment of legal ends more likely to be secured by other
means. One has the strong sense that the Court is not referring only to
itself, to its own capacity to marshal understanding at the apex of the
judicial process for focusing issues. 149 It is speaking at least as much
about the geographically dispersed and disparate lower courts, which
the Supreme Court understands it does not fully control, and which
operate in variable competition with the nationally organized agency.
D. A Residual Role forJudicialActivism? Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
The understanding of Chevron 15 0 suggested here may also make it
possible to resolve the asserted tension between that case and Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 5 a strong endorsement of quite aggressive judicial review of
agency action decided only a year earlier. 1 52 State Farm was the judicial
review proceeding successfully challenging the Department of Transportation's attempted rescission of a rule requiring the use of passive
restraints such as pre-attached belts and air bags in the front compartment of all passenger vehicles. The rule had been adopted during the
previous administration after lengthy and harrowing rulemaking proceedings. In rescinding it, the new Secretary of Transportation relied
on studies indicating that pre-attached belts would be the near-universal mode chosen for compliance, and many drivers would disable these
belts. She expressed doubt whether the safety benefits from a requirement that could so easily be defeated would exceed the costs of installing these belts in all cars.' 5 3 This is just the kind of decision the
Secretary is authorized to make, and it would be hard to say in the abstract that the underlying facts compelled a decision one way or the
other.
Reversing, the Supreme Court expressed some doubts whether the
studies the Secretary relied upon supported her judgments.' 54 More
149. To be sure, even at the Court, the episodic character of judicial intervention
may give rise to reasonable fears whether judges can expect to understand well the interrelations of a complex statutory scheme, which an agency administers daily.
150. 467 U.S. at 837.
151. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

152. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
153. 463 U.S. at 34-40.
154. Id. at 51-52.
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important, the Court pointed to two failures of reasoning. First, the
Secretary had failed to consider whether, if seat-belts could be so easily
defeated, the better alternative would not be to require air bags or
other less easily defeated devices. 155 Second, she had not considered
the effect of driver inertia on the use rate of even the pre-attached belts;
that is, even though they could be disabled, the belts would remain in
place until someone took the trouble to disable them. Moreover, if
would remain in use until,
ever reattached-say, for a longer trip-they
56
again, someone affirmatively undid them.'
The result did not deny that the Secretary might on a proper showing be able to rescind the rule. Rather, the Court found that she had
failed to give adequate justification for her decision to do so, and must
reconsider the matter.1 57 The result was to place the imprimatur of the
Court on the so-called "hard-look" doctrine, by which the courts of
appeals (notably but not exclusively the D.C. Circuit) have placed
strong obligations upon the administrative agencies to explain their
actions.
The tension between Chevron and State Farm has been widely
noted, 158 perhaps especially by courts of appeals judges, whose review
of administrative action both opinions govern.' 5 9 Chevron counsels a
limited judicial role in determining questions of statutory meaning that,
given their law-declaring character, are traditionally viewed as central
to the judiciary's role. State Farm, on the other hand, appears to endorse aggressive judicial review of agency policymaking decisions, matters often characterized as appropriate for the application of
administrative expertise. A leading figure on the D.C. Circuit, to which
both the Chevron and the State Farm signals were sent, was heard to complain soon afterwards that the Court ought to decide which it preferred,
strong or deferential review.1 60 Judge Breyer of the First Circuit asked
16 1
if the Court did not have its priorities precisely backwards.
Yet, from the management perspective offered here, the two cases
can be seen as not only consistent but also complementary. To understand Chevron as a statement about the allocation of some functions between court and agency is not to identify the judicial role as a weak one.
155. Id. at 46-51.
156. Id. at 51-56.
157. Id. at 57.
158. See, e.g., Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505
(1985); Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 Geo. LJ. 1

(1985).
159. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 102; Mikva, The Changing Role ofJudicial Review, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 115 (1986); Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3
YaleJ. on Reg. 283 (1986).
160. Comment by Chief Judge Patricia Wald, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit, at program on scope ofjudicial review, Administrative Law Section,
ABA (Oct. 1985).
161. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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Lower court pretense to precision about the detailed meaning of complex statutes threatens to impair the administration of those statutes in
ways the Supreme Court will be incapable of policing; and the geographical dispersion of the lower courts supervising national programs
threatens to compound that problem by imposing variations from region to region, as different courts attempt to resolve similar issues.
The hard-look review endorsed by State Farm has its own possible
costs-including a tendency to produce excessive agency effort on any
given administrative action, to the general prejudice of an agency's
level of accomplishment.1 6 2 But any particular example of hard-look
review will be less likely to impose demands on the Court's limited
resources.
Thus, while an excessively hard judicial look at a particular agency
result may defeat, or at least delay, that result, hard-look review of any
given agency result should happen just once. Its legal effect, therefore,
is limited to the particular administrative proceeding at hand. Once it
has become final, the result as to that proceeding is fixed; nonacquiescence in ajudgment that the air bag rule is invalid, or a conflict among
the circuits on that issue, is difficult to imagine.' 6 3 As long as the practice of hard-look review continues to be accepted, an uncorrected lower
court error of this dimension, however costly to the particular enterprise being challenged, presents less of a claim on the Court's limited
resources.
This understanding of the relationship between Chevron and State
Farm solves a problem inherent in the analysis offered by Judge Starr,
another member of the D.C. Circuit, writing shortly after Chevron and
focusing attention on the nonjudicial character of the agencies. 164 He
reminded us, correctly, that agencies differ from courts in the political
relationships they enjoy with President and Congress, and he sought to
draw on the paradigmatic relationships courts have with the President
and with Congress to suggest limitations on the character and extent
ofjudicial review of administration action. Chevron, he wrote, should be
understood as we would understand judicial refusal to second-guess a
congressional judgment in enacting a statute, or an executive judgment
162. Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle

Safety, 4 YaleJ. on Reg. 257 (1987).
163. The hard-look rule has been developed and applied in the context of direct
judicial review of agency rulemaking, which will occur in a single action.
164. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283 (1986).
This understanding differs as well from the suggestions of Judge Mikva, Mikva, The
Changing Role ofJudicial Review, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 115, 129-34 (1986), and Merrick
Garland, Garland, Deregulation andJudicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 551, 558-59
(1985), that the distinction between the cases lies in the differing quality of decisionmaking their records revealed, or in differing qualities of statutory mandate. While
doubtless these and other matters suggestive of agency competence are important, see
Diver, supra note 116, the Supreme Court has at least equal reason to be concerned
about the competence and performance of the courts of appeals.
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in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution. "[T]he Court, in its
checking and balancing relationship with the coordinate branches, is
much more deferential than in its role as supervisor of the lower
courts."' 16

5

"Chevron strongly suggests that courts should see them-

selves not as supervisors of agencies, but more as a check or bulwark
against abuses of agency power."' 16 6
Viewed in this light, Judge Starr suggested, Chevron is consistent
with other decisions that distinguish the court-agency relationship from
the court-court relationship. Thejudicial system adopts rules that provide richly for the conduct of proceedings within the judiciary; but
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 167 holds that courts may not create procedures in excess of statutory command to govern agency proceedings. Similarly, an appellate
court will review the process by which a lower judge reasons from the
basic facts established at trial to its legal conclusions essentially de
novo; in contrast, agency judgments of this character are to be accepted
unless they are "arbitrary [or] capricious."' 168 From these developmentsJudge Starr concludes that "Article IIIjudges lack general supervisory authority over the agencies" and "have a duty . . . to avoid

intrusions not clearly mandated by Congress or the Constitution into
the processes and decisions of any other branch."' 69 "Chevron conveyed the clear message to the lower federal courts that theirs is not to
supervise the administrative agencies.... Policy, which is not the natural province of courts, belongs properly to the administrative agencies,
and, ultimately, to the executive and legislature that oversee them."' 170
As this last quotation may suggest, Judge Starr's emphasis on separation of powers led him, not surprisingly, to advocate deferential review of the consistency of agency decisionmaking in State Farm cases.
He identifies the effort to preserve doctrinal consistency as perhaps the
principal characteristic, today, of the Supreme Court's relationship with
the lower federal courts. "In contrast ....the Court makes no attempt
to ensure that presidential policies or congressional decisionmaking are
internally consistent" beyond minimal constitutional constraints. 17 1
While briefly acknowledging that State Farm endorses a "searching and
careful" review of agency decisions to ensure appropriate explanation
and prevent irrationality, 17 2 Judge Starr appears to believe courts
should look little harder at the consistency of products of agency action
than they do in the cases of congressional or presidential decision.1 73
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Starr, supra note 164, at 301.
Id. at 300-01.
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1980).
Starr, supra note 164, at 308.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 305; compare, however, the rigorousness of his review efforts for the
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This is the most troubling aspect ofJudge Starr's analysis, for one
is hard put to find in it an understanding of the affirmative judicial role
or, to put it another way, what contribution law can make to what he so
correctly identifies as a mixed setting of law and politics. The idea that
agency changes in position must be explained and justified, and the
associated characterization of the judicial role as that of assuring a hard
look by the agency at its data and options, are, for him, relics of the
inappropriate supervisory role. One would like to believe that he
means only to protect the agency's prerogative to change general policy
directions within its assigned arena of operation with the political
winds; yet one's impression is that he means also to deny the appropriateness of judges' requiring agencies to articulate a policy in order to
act, or to demonstrate the consistency of challenged agency action with
such agency policy as may already be in place. The result is an impoverished judicial role, indeed.
Understanding Chevron as in part a practical statement rooted in
the realities of the Supreme Court's limitations as a supervisor of the
courts of appeals, rather than as a theoretical statement about separation of powers, permits one still to insist that the agencies behave as if
they were constrained by law-to demand greater coherence with previous actions than could ordinarily be demanded of Congress or the
President. The agency can change, but it must know that it is changing,
have a reason for doing so, and appear to promise that (until the next
change) this is the rule that it will now follow. Anyone looking realistically at the winding path from, say, Maryland v. Wirtz 1 74 to National
League of Cities v. Usery 175 to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority 17 6 will recognize that that demand on the agencies is little different from the vision of law that courts apply to themselves. Chevron
and Vermont Yankee, 17 7 in this light, acknowledge judicial handicaps, but
they do not suppose (as Judge Starr apparently would) that the link
between court and agency is any less important to the success of our
governmental arrangements than that between Congress and agency,
178
or President and agency.
Judge Breyer's difficulty with State Farm's endorsement of the hardlook approach 179 is not as easily countered. That approach, he fears,
invites judges to assess reasoning and choice about policy and technological fact, for which they are poorly equipped. The prospect of such
review, while imposing no legal barrier to agency action, may discourcourt in FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1087-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and National Coalition
Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

174. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
175. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

176.
177.
178.
tionalism

469 U.S. 528 (1985).
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
See Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 87; see also Sunstein, ConstituAfter the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming).

179. Breyer, supra note 102, at 388-94.
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age change from the status quo. An agency's interest in considering a
change, he reasonably suggests, will likely be inversely related to the
extent of the resources it believes it must commit to the effort. Absent
some basis for confidence that such judicial oversight in fact improves
agency performance,' 8 0 he argues, these are inappropriate risks to be
taking. A recent study of rulemaking by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration supports Judge Breyer's concern, finding that by
the year 1977 rulemaking in that agency had been stymied by the elaborate efforts required to produce an outcome that might survive such
8
review. 1 1
It may indeed be that agency inaction is the price of hard-look review, and a higher one than we should choose to pay. Yet Judge
Breyer's criticism of Chevron still requires him to assume the precise
decision model of statutory interpretation, or at least the availability of
Supreme Court review. Perhaps these are understandable assumptions, even as amiable fiction, for one who has chosen the judiciary over
the academy as the place within which to make his life's mark. Withdraw these premises, however, and the greater capacity of the judiciary
to resolve questions of statutory meaning no longer appears. One is
driven back to reliance on the general discipline of the courts-indeed,
to the contribution to judicial modesty made by the very strength of his
proposition about the difficulty of hard-look review.
Thus, one might conclude, the Court's management realities are,
indeed, having a significant impact. Judicial attention to such issues as
consistency with prior actions and the articulation of appropriate reasoning need not take courts beyond their ordinary competence. That
judges should refrain from involving themselves directly in agency policy choices is a proposition of long standing - accepted by the Court in
State Farm and given emphatic statement in Chevron and other contemporary decisions.' 8 2 That they should refrain from imposing procedural requirements is, as Judge Starr remarked, established by Vermont
Yankee.' 8 3 Yet both requirements doubtless can be evaded by an undis180. Compare Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale LJ.
38, 60 (1975) ("[S]uchjudicial opinions... give those who care about well-documented
and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who do not") with
R. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (1983) (effect of
court review on EPA produces conflicting directives, hampering achievement of tasks).
181. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 162.
182. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (sufficient that commission "considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection"); see also Professor Koch's recent, interesting and helpful analysis, Judicial
Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 469 (1986), in particular his
suggested distinction between discretion to execute statutes, as by filling in the gaps of
an incomplete delegation, and discretion to make policy, as by reaching accommodations of competing social or political factors, id. at 479-9 1. The judiciary is properly
much more deeply involved in the former, which closely resembles decision on questions of law.
183. 435 U.S. 579 (1978).
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ciplined court persuaded to insert itself in the agency role. And such
departures from the appropriate judicial role, like court of appeals misuse of substantial evidence review, will be both hard to detect and unlikely to be persuasive as a reason for the Suprmee Court to exercise its
review jurisdiction. That rulemaking as a whole is being inhibited will
be hard to establish in any given proceeding. That hard look review
may have these broader impacts is only one more indication of the difficulties of the Court's position.
CONCLUSION

As indicated at the outset of this essay, my purpose in writing has
largely been a descriptive one-to see whether some interesting
changes in the Court's approach to statutory and administrative matters
might be explainable in terms of its increasingly marginal grip over the
work of the courts of appeals. I think that can be done, and the reader
will judge for herself the success of the venture.18 4 If she agrees that
some of the Court's recent directions are apparent responses to the
remoteness of its role, the question remains whether those responses
are acceptable ones. I offer no prescription for what ought to be done.
It does seem right to conclude, however, with the observation that this
stark picture of the Court's problem suggests a much more dramatic
response than one might make on the basis of counting the particular
conflicts among the circuits that appear to have passed by unresolved.
At root, the issue may be as simple as whether we are prepared for
the consequences of a Court four times as remote from the rest of the
nation's judiciary as it was when a perceived caseload crisis prompted
creation of its current jurisdictional relationships. If not, if it is important to return the courts of appeals to a position in which their discipline by higher judicial authority is a believable prospect, it is hard to
imagine that that can be accomplished by such measures as the proposed intercircuit tribunal.' 8 5 A single rotating panel of circuit court
judges, hearing far fewer cases than the Court in any given year, and in
a complex jurisdictional relationship with the Court that will itself consume time, will not significantly affect a circuit panel's perception of its
probable finality or the richness of the body of national law available
for its guidance. Nor will it have the constancy of personnel or hierarchical superiority that over time promotes effectiveness and respect.
To achieve significant change in the level of discipline to which the
184. One may wish to consider as well other possible outcroppings of the suggested phenomenon: the Court's treatment of pornography, of habeas corpus and,
most recently, of arbitration are other doctrinal areas readers of early drafts have suggested might be seen in management terms. Its emphasis on defining formulas for deciding constitutional issues such as "compelling state interests," threatens also to place
it at some remove from direct consideration of issues of constitutionality. See supra
note 120.
185. See Baker & McFarland, supra note 1; Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 1.
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courts of appeals are subject, rather, one would have to think of a
number of panels in a court intermediate between the circuits and the
Supreme Court.' 8 6 Five panels of seven judges each in a new judicial
tier would enjoy about the same relationship with today's circuit courts
as the Supreme Court had with the circuits in 1925, while also producing opinions at a sufficiently reduced rate to promise significant
Supreme Court control of their own output. Perhaps such panels, taking over the troublesome en banc process as well as conflicts within
their catchment areas, could effectively discipline the appellate courts,
and so encourage consistency.
A new tier of appellate courts would hardly qualify as a panacea. It
would make the Supreme Court more remote from the front line of
litigation; analagous structural reforms in the executive branch, as it
has grown, have failed fully to deliver on their promise of enhanced
control.' 8 7 Even if review by a new tier of courts were discretionary, as
the Court's is, adding a new judicial step would entail new costs in time
and resources. The problem is that without such a change, without interposing a new tribunal of such modest dimensions that the Supreme
Court can have some reasonable hope of controlling it, the Court's incentives to a management orientation, with all that entails, will remain
unaddressed.
186. A more complete response to this problem would require considering whether
this new level of court might be given initial federal jurisdiction over review of state
court judgments as well.
187. H. Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 185,
193-96 (1981).

